Nek Mohammed:
Probably the first militant leader of note in FATA, Nek Mohammed
was 27 when he was killed in the
very
first US drone strike in Pakistan, in June 2004. He fought against the Army
when they launched an operation in South Waziristan to drive out the foreigners
based there, and caused considerable losses.
He was then handed a peace deal, called the Shakai
Agreement, which didn’t last. So the Pakistan Army requested the US to take him
out. After the strike the Army claimed that it was them who killed him, but not
many believed them. His grave reportedly became a shrine and his killing only
provided more motivation & impetus for militancy in the tribal areas.
Shakai Agreement -
2004:
The deal between Nek Mohammed and the military entailed
registering of foreigners in the area and a halt of cross-border attacks into
Afghanistan. The military in turn would pay for the damage it caused to
property of tribal people and pay for repaying their debts to Al-Qaeda.
More importantly, many have argued, the military afforded
Nek Mohammed stature. Gen Safdar Hussain went to a madrassa in Shakai to ratify
the deal; the militants’ turf. He also bypassed the tribal elders and Political
Agent, making them look weak.
Nek Mohammed called himself a “soldier of Pakistan” at the
occasion. Later he refused to stop supporting the fight in Afghanistan. That
led to his killing and another op. But near the end of the same year the
agreement was revived, with his successors. The new agreement didn’t require
the
militants
to register foreigners, only to stop cross-border attacks.
The part about registering foreigners turned out to be the
biggest issue for failure of the original agreement. The government claimed
that registering foreigners meant handing over the foreign fighters to the
military. Nek Mohammed had given shelter to notorious Uzbek militant Tahir
Yuldashev, and basically fought the army to protect him. He didn’t see how
registering meant surrendering the Uzbeks.
Baitullah Mehsud:
Baitullah Mehsud was the first leader or Amir of the TTP,
killed in a drone strike in 2009. He gained notoriety in 2005, highlighted by the
Sararogha deal. It’s been reported that he was appointed Mullah Omar’s governor
for the Mehsud tribe, in the presence of other local Taliban leaders, back in
the day.
Although Nek Mohammed is said to have targeted pro-government tribal
elders or maliks,
Baitullah
excelled in this. He had a special taskforce whose sole reason was to
eliminate anyone suspected of siding with the US or the Pakistani government.
Sararogha Agreement:
The second famous, or infamous, peace deal was the Sararogha
deal in early 2005. This was also in South Waziristan. After Nek Muhammed’s
death, Baitullah and Abdullah Mehsud rose as prominent militant leaders.
Abdullah was a former Guantanamo detainee and had been involved in kidnapping
some Chinese engineers. The military didn’t want to talk to him.
So they talked to Baitullah. The deal struck with him wasn’t
similar to the one with Nek Mohammed. Baitullah wouldn’t attack Pakistani
forces, they wouldn’t target him. He would not provide sanctuary or aid to
foreign fighters.
Like the last agreement, the government had to pay tribal
people for damages caused during the fighting that preceded it.
Baitullah made a point of milking this. At the ceremony he
is reported to have said that he only started fighting after the military
started the operation, and that caused loss of property and other hardships for
the local people.
The deal broke
down soon. It’s not clear what incident triggered that. Abdullah Mehsud had
significant influence. His men weren’t bound to not carry out anti-state
activities. When Baitullah renounced the deal in July, he claimed army had broken the deal first.
TTP:
In 2007 Baitullah became Amir of the newly formed
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. The organization pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar.
When a TTP spokesman or “senior militant commander” talked to a national
newspaper about the formation of the TTP, he said militants from
South Waziristan, North Waziristan,
Aurakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur and some districts of NWFP like
Swat, Buner, Dir, Malakand, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, Peshawar, Dera Ismail
Khan and Kohat had decided to “
speed up their joint "Jihad" against the US
and Nato forces in neighbouring Afghanistan.”
They also pledged to fight the Pakistani forces in
self-defence, termed elsewhere as “defensive Jihad”, and demanded an end to
military operations in North Waziristan & Swat.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur was named second in command of the TTP in
the initial meeting. He however developed differences with Baitullah over
attacking the Pakistani state. It wasn’t until 2009 that, reportedly at the
insistence of Mullah Omer
,
the two buried the hatchet.
Mullah Nazir:
Nazir was the third man who buried the hatchet that day. He
too was opposed to Baitullah’s Pakistan centric approach. He reportedly/allegedly
had a peace deal with the security forces dating back to 2007.
Based in South Waziristan, Nazir had a particular disdain
for the Uzbeks. He killed scores of them even when they were allied with the
TTP. That didn’t endear him to the TTP, despite being in at least
a
couple of alliances/agreements with them.
Hakimullah Mehsud:
Hakimullah was the next leader of the TTP, and recently met
his demise in a drone strike. He had been an important leader in the TTP before
taking over command, and soon after he
masterminded
an attack on the CIA to avenge Baitullah. That attack has been termed the
deadliest against the agency in years.
This prompted the CIA to go after him with more vigour than
usual. Coupled with the fact that South Waziristan, TTP base up-till 2009, was
stormed by the Pakistani Army soon after Baitullah’s killing, Hakimullah spent a
lot of his time as Amir in hiding.
This did not, apparently, reduce his effectiveness. Even
though they control a much smaller region when compared to the heyday under
Baitullah, the TTP perhaps became more relevant. For instance, they targeted specific
political parties and tried to influence elections.
Coincidentally, they grew much closer to Afghanistan during
this period. Then TTP-Swat head Mullah Fazlullah permanently moved to Afghanistan
from where he has orchestrated many attacks into Pakistan, including the one on
Malala Yosufzai.
------------------------------------------------------------
The commonality between all of them, apart from death via
drone or as I like to call it; DVD ™, is the allegiance to Mullah Omer & a
declared support for fighting the US in Afghanistan. Sheltering foreign
fighters is another, although Mullah Nazir is complicated. Even though he hated
the Uzbeks, as with some other good Taliban, he still didn’t mind the Saudis. I
read somewhere that his crackdown against the Uzbeks started when they
assassinated two of his Saudi guests.
The differences between them are also striking. They went
from “support fighting in Afghanistan” to “don’t want to fight Pakistan” to “defensive
jihad” to “all-out war”. As the war has dragged on, their stances have become
more and more extreme, and not just in terms of fighting Pakistan.
Military action and drones, the former dating back to 2002
or 2003, and the later to 2004, have not only failed spectacularly to stem this
slide, they have been the biggest catalyst. War apparently promotes that kinda
thing. Go figure.
To focus on drones specifically, let’s weigh what they have
achieved and what they have cost.
Impact:
All of the above are high profile insurgents who were killed in drone strikes.
Drones are supposedly an accurate and not-putting-soldiers-in-harm’s-way
method of killing militants. There have been
281
or
345 or
367 drone
attacks in Pakistan, killing kids
as young as 12 to veteran women
s as old as 67.
The only tangible way these deaths have benefited us, or impacted the larger scheme of things is by creating opportunities for a quarrel over
succession within the TTP.
Other than that, there are little gains. The TTP is an umbrella
group and pretty decentralized. Separate chapters are independent in their
actions, so it isn’t clear how striking at specific leaders would, or does,
hamper their operational capabilities.
Nor does it scare them. Or deter. In any sense that would benefit us.
From Nek Mohammed to Hakimullah, after each killing, as a rule, a more demented
guy takes over, with a more aggressive, vile agenda. Take Fazlullah for
example.
No drone strike I can think of has actually resulted in
wrestling back territory from the TTP. In fact, North Waziristan (245 drone
strikes), the most droned place on earth outside Afghanistan, remains the
strongest bastion of Taliban.
Minor Issues:
No point in pretending that people give a shit about
civilian deaths, so let's focus on the larger picture. In the last decade, drones are pretty much the best thing that has happened to the
Taliban. At least the Pakistani ones.
What was achieved from getting Nek Mohammed droned?
His death didn’t break the spirit of his fighters. Thousands
attended
his funeral, he became a rallying cry and, as mentioned above, months later
we had to concede a more humiliating deal to his successors.
More than that, it was the way the whole affair was handled.
ISPR claimed back then that any suggestion of American involvement in his
killing was “absolutely absurd”. He was killed by Pakistan. Clearly not taken
into account while making this claim; the fact that people have eyes.
They did the same thing when a drone struck a seminary in Bajaur, 2006. It killed over 80, labelled militants. After the
attack, Pakistani helicopters arrived at the spot and fired at nearby hills.
Another pathetic claim was made, that the military had carried out the attack.
A commission of the Peshawar High Court Bar Association and Peshawar
District Bar Association ascertained that the Pakistani Helicopters
arrived
a full 20-25 minutes after the attack and most of the 80 plus dead were kids
aged between 9-18.
Around a month later 42 soldiers were
killed
in a revenge attack. As in they called and said, “Hey, we killed 42
soldiers because of that drone strike”.
Pakistan owned these attacks. We requested some. Even now,
or until the last government, our
Presidents
gave the go ahead. Yet utter shock is witnessed when suggested we have to
face the blowback.
The commonality among all the Taliban militants, as
mentioned above, is the pledge of loyalty to Mullah Omar and enmity with the
US. And in “our” war that was ordered, and is completely paid for, by the US,
drone attacks are the most visible link of our alliance with the Americans.
Drones are not a decisive weapon or a trump card. They haven't pushed the fight an inch closer to the end. In fact, what they are is the foremost tool for prolonging it.
Even if bad options are all we have in this war; drones shouldn’t
be one.